Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities Should be Realists about Quantum States by Myrvold, Wayne C.
Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities
Should be Realists about Quantum States
Wayne C. Myrvold
Department of Philosophy
The University of Western Ontario
wmyrvold@uwo.ca
Forthcoming in Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker, eds.,
Quantum, Probability, Logic: The Work and Influence of
Itamar Pitowsky (Springer Nature, 2020).
Abstract
There is a significant body of literature, which includes Itamar
Pitowksy’s “Betting on Outcomes of Measurements,” that sheds light
on the structure of quantum mechanics, and the ways in which it differs
from classical mechanics, by casting the theory in terms of agents’ bets
on the outcomes of experiments. Though this approach, by itself,
is neutral as to the ontological status of quantum observables and
quantum states, some, notably those who adopt the label “QBism”
for their views, take this approach as providing incentive to conclude
that quantum states represent nothing in physical reality, but, rather,
merely encode an agent’s beliefs. In this chapter, I will argue that
the arguments for realism about quantum states go through when
the probabilities involved are taken to be subjective, if the conclusion
is about the agent’s beliefs: an agent whose credences conform to
quantum probabilities should believe that preparation procedures with
which she associates distinct pure quantum states produce distinct
states of reality. The conclusion can be avoided only by stipulation
of limitations on the agent’s theorizing about the world, limitations
that are not warranted by the empirical success of quantum mechanics
or any other empirical considerations. Subjectivists about quantum
probabilities should be realists about quantum states.
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1 Introduction
There is a conception of probability, which often goes by the name of subjec-
tive probability, that takes probability to have to do with an agent’s degrees
of belief. An important step in the development of this conception was its
integration with decision theory, pioneered by Ramsey and de Finetti, and
developed more fully by Savage. On this view, an agent’s preferences be-
tween acts (often illustrated by choices of bets to make or accept) are taken
to be indications of the agent’s degrees of belief in various propositions.
It is an attractive idea to extend this conception to quantum probabil-
ities. One systematic development of this idea can be found in Pitowsky’s
“Betting on the outcomes of measurements: a Bayesian theory of quantum
probability” (Pitowsky, 2003). The idea also forms the basis of the position
(or family of positions) known as QBism (Caves et al., 2002, 2007; Fuchs and
Schack, 2013; Fuchs et al., 2014; Fuchs, 2017; Fuchs and Stacey, 2019). Pro-
ponents of such views tend to also take quantum states to be nothing more
than codifications of an agent’s beliefs. But the argument for this conclusion
is never spelled out with sufficient clarity.
On the other hand, we find arguments—of which the theorem of Pusey,
Barrett, and Rudolph (2012) is the best known—for the opposite conclu-
sion, namely, that quantum states should be taken to represent elements of
physical reality. If interpreting quantum probabilities as subjective leads one
inexorably to rejecting an ontic view of quantum states, then there must
be something about the reasoning behind these arguments that doesn’t go
through on a subjective reading of probability. In this chapter, I will argue
that this is not the case. Suitably interpreted, a version of the PBR argu-
ment leads to the conclusion that an agent who takes quantum mechanics
as a guide for setting her subjective degrees of belief about the outcomes of
future experiments ought to believe that preparations with which she asso-
ciates distinct pure states result in ontically distinct physical states of affairs
(this terminology will be explained in section 3, below). Note that this con-
clusion is entirely about the agent’s beliefs. We are not presuming, as part
of the argument, that the agent’s beliefs in any way reflect physical reality.
That is a matter for the agent’s own judgment (though, of course, there is an
implication that if you take quantum mechanics as a guide for setting your
degrees of belief about the outcomes of future experiments, you should take
distinct pure states to be ontically distinct).
The argument, of course, involves assumptions about the agent’s cre-
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dences. It is also assumed that the agent may entertain theories about the
way the world is, and have degrees of belief in such theories. It is, of course,
logically possible to reject all such theorizing. If such a move is proposed in
connection with quantum theory, then the question arises whether the empir-
ical evidence that led the community of physicists to accept quantum theory
over classical theory provides any incentive for the move. I will argue that we
have no reason whatsoever to make such a move. Anyone is, of course, free
to make such a move without reason, as a free choice. Dissuasion of someone
so inclined will not be the topic of this chapter; what concerns us here is the
evidential situation.
2 Credence and action: some preliminary con-
siderations
In this section I would like to bring to the reader’s mind some considerations
of the sort that may be called “pre-theoretical”—the sort of considerations
that tend to be taken for granted, prior to any physical theorizing. They are,
for that reason, to be thought of as neither particularly classical nor quantum.
I do not take myself to be saying anything new, radical, or contentious. Of
course, one may start a scientific investigation with certain presuppositions
about the way the world is, and end up concluding, as a result of one’s
investigations, that some of those presuppositions are false. If any readers
are inclined to dispute some assertion made in this section, then I will ask
that reader to provide evidence for the falsity of the assertion. I hope that
it goes without saying that the mere fact that some proposition leads to an
unwelcome conclusion does not suffice as evidence that the proposition is
false.
Consider the following situation. You are attending a lecture, and you
are taking notes on a laptop. This process involves a sequence of choices:
you are choosing, at every moment, which, if any, keys to hit. Why are you
doing this? If you are taking notes for your own benefit, as an aid to memory,
then, presumably, you believe that, at some later date, you will be able to
see or hear or feel (depending on the device used for readout) something
that will be informative about your prior choices of key-strokes. If you are
taking notes for someone else’s benefit, then, presumably, you believe that,
at a later date, that other agent will be able to see or hear or feel something
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that will be informative about your earlier choices of key-strokes.1
Why are you using a laptop, rather than, say, a kumquat? Presumably,
you believe that there is something about the internal structure of the laptop
that makes it suitable for the purpose. Suppose that you can use the readout
to distinguish between two alternative choices of things to write today. For
concreteness, consider a choice between writing
A ‘Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe.
B Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer by this sun
of York.
If you believe that the readout tomorrow will allow you to distinguish between
having made choice A and choice B today (in case you’re forgetful)—that is,
if you believe that the laptop can serve as an auxiliary memory—this is to
attribute to the laptop a certain role in a causal process linking your choice
today to your experience tomorrow. Even if you have little or no idea of the
internal workings of the laptop, attribution of this causal role to the laptop
involves an assumption that your action will have an effect on the internal
state of the laptop, and the effect your action had on the internal state of
the laptop will, in turn, have an effect on what it is that you experience
tomorrow.
Now, an extreme version of operationalism might forbid you to entertain
conjectures about the internal state of the laptop, and speak only of the re-
lations between your act today and the readout tomorrow, with no mention
of intervening variables. But the fact is that you are using a laptop rather
than a kumquat, and, in fact, would not attempt to use a kumquat for this
purpose, and that means that you believe that there is something about the
physical constitution of the laptop that makes it suitable for the role you
wish it to play in the causal chain between your act today and the read-
out tomorrow. Caution should be exercised in theorizing about the internal
workings of the laptop, but, as long as we are careful not to be committed to
anything more than what we have good evidence for, there is no harm, and
some potential benefit, in theorizing about the processes that mediate your
actions today and experiences tomorrow.
1One might also consider the following situation. You are reading a text of which you
are not the author. Presumably, you take what you are reading as informative about what
choices of keystrokes the author made while composing it. If not, then why are you still
reading?
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Suppose, then, that you begin—tentatively, and with all due caution—to
form a theory about the inner workings of the laptop. What constraints do
your beliefs about the input-output relations of the laptop place on the sorts
of theories you should entertain about its inner workings?
It seems that there are a few general things that can be said. If you believe
that the laptop can serve as a means for discriminating (with certainty)
between act A and act B, you should believe that there are distinct sets of
internal states corresponding to these two acts. That is, the set of states
that the laptop could end up in, as a result of your performing act A, has
no overlap with the set of states that it could end up in as a result of your
performing act B. Moreover, these two sets of states are distinguishable upon
readout—the readout mechanism produces outputs, corresponding to the two
sets of internal states associated with acts A and B, that are perceptually
distinguishable by you. The only alternative to believing this is to believe
in a direct causal effect of your choice today on your experience tomorrow,
unmediated by any effect on the state of the world in the interim.
Of course, discrimination with absolute certainty is too much to ask. You
might not regard your laptop as a completely reliable means for obtaining
information about your past choices of key-strokes. That’s okay; it can still
be informative, as long as if you take some perceived outputs to be more
likely, given some choices of keystrokes, than others. We can cash this out in
terms of your conditional degrees of belief.
All of this will be formalized in the next section.
3 Constructing a framework
Let us begin to formalize the informal considerations of the previous section.2
To simplify matters, we will imagine a Bayesian agent, Alice, whose gra-
dations of strength of belief in various propositions can be represented by a
real-valued function satisfying the axioms of probability. We will call this
function the agent’s credence function, and the value that it takes on a given
proposition p, the agent’s credence in p. We will avoid talking of “prob-
ability,” in case that, for some, the word has connotations of something
non-subjective.
2The framework of this section is based on the ontological models framework of Harrigan
and Spekkens (2010).
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We consider some physical system (you may think of the laptop as a
running example), with which our agent will engage. She has some set of
operations {φ1, . . . , φn} that can be performed on the system at time t0
(think choices of key-strokes). We will also consider situations in which an
act is chosen without Alice’s knowledge of which one; she has an n-sided die
that she can toss (and when she does, her credence is equally divided among
the possible outcomes), and a gadget that will choose among the operations
{φ1, . . . , φn}, depending on the outcome of the die-throw.
At some later time t1, she performs an operation R (a “readout” opera-
tion), which will result in one of a set of perceptually distinguishable results
{r1, . . . rm}. (We can, of course, generalize, and give her a choice of opera-
tions to perform, but for our purposes, one will suffice.)
We assume that our agent has conditional credences, crA(rk|φi), repre-
senting credence in result rk on the supposition of act φi. Upon learning the
result of the operation R, she uses these to update, via conditionalization,
her credences about which act was performed.
Alice does not believe that the acts {φi} have a direct influence on the
outcomes {rk}, unmediated by any effect of those acts on the system S.
We will permit her to entertain various theories about the workings of the
system. Any theory T of that sort will involve a set ΩT of possible physical
states. At the level of generality at which we are operating, we will assume
nothing about the structure of these state-spaces ΩT , and, in particular, do
not assume that they are either classical or quantum in structure. We do
assume that, on the supposition of theory T , Alice can form credences in
propositions about the state of the system S to the effect that the system’s
state is in a subset ∆ of ΩT , and that, for each theory T , there is an algebra
AT of subsets of ΩT deemed suitable for credences of that sort.
Suppose, now that Alice regards the state of the system to be relevant to
the outcome of the readout operation. What she thinks about that relevance
may, of course, depend on the theory T . To represent these judgments, we
suppose her to have conditional credences of the form crA(rk|φi, T, ω). This is
her conditional credence, on the supposition of theory T and the supposition
that the state of the system is ω ∈ ΩT , that the result of the readout will be rk,
if act φi is performed. It should be stressed that these are Alice’s conditional
credences; there is no assumption that these conditional credences mirror any
causal structure out there in the rest of the world. Alice may hope that her
conditional credences reflect something of the causal structure of the world
(or rather, the causal structure, according to theory T ), but no assumption
6
to the effect that they do reflect the causal structure of the world will form
any part of our argument, because our conclusions will only be about what
Alice should believe.
We assume, also, that, on the supposition of T , Alice has credences about
the states produced by the acts φi. For any subset ∆ of ΩT that is in AT , let
crA(∆|T, φi) be Alice’s conditional credence, on the supposition of theory T ,
that performing act φi would put the system into a state in ∆. Her credences
about the state should mesh with her conditional credences crA(rk|φi, T, ω)
to yield her act-outcome conditional credences, on the supposition of theory
T :
crA(rk|φi, T ) = 〈crA(rk|φi, T, ω)〉, (1)
where the angle-brackets 〈 · 〉 indicate expectation value taken with respect
to her credences crA(∆|T, φi) about the state, given act φi. If {Tj} is the set
of theories that Alice takes seriously enough to endow with nonzero credence,
then her act-outcome conditional credences crA(rk|φi) should satisfy
crA(rk|φi) =
∑
j
crA(rk|φi, Tj) crA(Tj). (2)
As mentioned, Alice does not believe that the acts {φi} have a direct
influence on the outcomes {rk}, unmediated by any effect of those acts on
the system S. This will be reflected in her conditional credences; her belief
can be captured by the condition that crA(rk|φi, T, ω) be independent of
which act is performed. That is, for all i, j,
crA(rk|φi, T, ω) = crA(rk|φj, T, ω), (3)
for all states ω ∈ ΩT . This is the condition that her choice of act has an
influence on the later outcome only via the influence of this choice on the
state of the system.
Now, part of the point of taking notes on a laptop is that what you
see later will permit you to distinguish between choices of key-strokes you
made earlier. There may be a limit to such discrimination; if you type
something and then delete it, the later readout might fail to distinguish
between alternatives for the deleted text. Some pairs of acts will be readout-
distinguishable; others will not. We will say that Alice takes two acts {φi, φj}
to be R-distinguishable if, for every outcome rk of the operation R, either
crA(rk|φi) or crA(rk|φj) is zero.
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If Alice takes two acts to be R-distinguishable, then, provided she takes
the influence of acts performed on the system on the later readout to be
mediated by a change in the state of the system, then she should also take
it that the sets of states that can result from the two acts are distinct. We
can formalize this; say that Alice takes the effects of acts {φi, φj} to be
ontically distinct, on the supposition of theory T , if there exists ∆ ⊆ AT
such that crA(∆|T, φi) = 1 and crA(∆|T, φj) = 0. We have the following
simple theorem.
Theorem 1 If an agent’s credences satisfy (1), (2) and (3), then, if she
takes two acts to be R-distinguishable for some operation R, then she also
takes the effects of those acts to be ontically distinct on any theory T in which
she places nonzero credence.
We emphasize: this is a theorem about Alice’s credences, not about actual
states of the system. Alice could be wrong in her judgment that the effects
on her laptop of different choices of keystrokes are ontically distinct. It might
be that her keystrokes have no effect whatsoever on the internal state of the
laptop (in which case she would be misguided in taking those acts to be
readout-distinguishable).
All of this is very general, and no assumptions have been made about
the sorts of theories that Alice might entertain. Now, suppose we apply it
to quantum mechanics, with quantum probabilities construed subjectively.
Suppose that Alice’s credences about the results of future readout operations
performed on system S can be represented by quantum states, and that which
quantum state it is that represents her credences depends on her choice of
act. If two acts are distinguishable by some experiment that can be done
on the system, the corresponding quantum states are orthogonal. If Alice
places nonzero credences only in theories for which her conditional credences
satisfy (3), then she should also believe that the effects of acts with which
she associates orthogonal quantum states are ontically distinct.
4 Ontic distinctness of non-orthogonal states
We have come to the conclusion that Alice should take the effects of preparation-
acts that she regards as R-distinguishable for some operation R to be onti-
cally distinct. This includes acts with which she associates orthogonal quan-
tum states. But what about non-orthogonal quantum states?
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Let {φ1, . . . , φn} be a set of preparation-acts that are such that Alice’s
credences about the results of future experiments, upon performance of these
acts, can be represented by pure quantum states {|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉}. If Alice
takes the effects of these acts to be ontically distinct, this means that she
believes that the physical state carries a trace of which preparation was
performed and, that, if she knew the physical state, this would be enough to
specify which of the quantum states {|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉} she deems appropriate
to use to set her credences about the results of future experiments. That is,
she believes that, for each physical state that could arise from one of these
preparations, there is a unique quantum state that “corresponds” to it as
the state to use in setting her credences. The correspondence might not be
one-one, as there might be a multiplicity of physical states that correspond
to the same quantum state.
If Alice believes that the effects of any pair of preparation-acts with which
she associates distinct pure quantum states are ontically distinct, then Alice
believes that there is something in physical reality corresponding to these
quantum states. We will say, in such a case, that Alice is a realist about pure
quantum states.
The PBR theorem can be adapted to provide a set of conditions on Alice’s
credences sufficient for her to be a realist about pure quantum states.
Following the terminology of Leifer (2014), we will say that Alice takes
a set {φ1, . . . , φn} of preparation-acts to be antidistinguishable if there is an
operation R such that, for each result rk, cr
A(rk|φi) is zero for at least one
φi. Though Alice might not be able to uniquely decide which of the acts
was performed, she will always be able to rule at least one out, whatever the
result of operation R is.
The setup of the PBR theorem is as follows. Suppose that we have
two systems, S1 and S2, of the same type, and suppose that each of them
can be subjected to either of two preparation-acts, {φ, ψ}. We assume that
each choice of preparation act performed on one system is compatible with
both choices of act performed on the other. This gives us four possibil-
ities of preparation-acts for the joint system, which we will designate by
{φ1 ⊗ φ2, φ1 ⊗ ψ2, ψ1 ⊗ φ2, ψ1 ⊗ ψ2}.
Suppose, now, that Alice regards these four preparation-acts as antidis-
tinguishable. Under certain further conditions, which we will now specify,
she should then take the effects of the preparation-acts φ and ψ on the two
systems to be ontically distinct.
A theory about the physical states of the two systems, presumably, would
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be able to treat S1 and S2 on their own, and also to regard the composite
system that has S1 and S2 as parts as a system in its own right. It will,
therefore, include state-spaces Ω1 and Ω2 for the individual systems, and a
state space Ω12 for the composite system. In a classical theory, to specify
the physical state of the composite system S1 + S2, it suffices to specify the
states of the component parts, and so the state of the composite can be
represented as an ordered pair 〈ω1, ω2〉 of states of the components, and Ω12
can be taken to be the set of all such ordered pairs. That is, Ω12 can be
taken to be the cartesian product of Ω1 and Ω2. For other theories, such
as quantum mechanical theories, the cartesian product Ω1 × Ω2 might be
included in Ω12 without exhausting it. In quantum mechanics, for any states
ψ1, ψ2 of two disjoint systems, there is a corresponding product state ψ1⊗ψ2
of the composite, but not all pure states of the composite system are of this
form, as there also pure entangled states.
We will say that a theory T satisfies the Cartesian Product Assumption
(CPA) if Ω1×Ω2 is a subset of Ω12. Given a theory satisfying the CPA, Alice’s
credences regarding a pair of preparations φ1, φ2 that can be performed on the
two subsystems will be said to satisfy the No Correlations Assumption (NCA)
if her credences about the joint state of the two systems, on the supposition
of T and the preparations φ1, φ2, are concentrated on the cartesian product
Ω1×Ω2 and if her credences are such that information about the state of one
system would be completely uninformative about the state of the other. The
conjunction of the Cartesian Product Assumption and the No Correlations
Assumption is called the Preparation Independence Postulate (PIP). Note
that this is a combination of an assumption about the structure of the state
space of a theory T and an assumption about Alice’s credences, conditional
on the supposition of T and on the preparations φ1, φ2.
Now suppose that we have a pair of systems S1, S2, a theory T about
them that satisfies the CPA, and, for each system, a pair of preparation-acts
φi, ψi, which are such that:
1. There is an operation R that can be performed on the pair of systems,
such that, for each outcome rk of the operation, at least one of
{crA(rk|φ1 ⊗ φ2), crA(rk|φ1 ⊗ ψ2), crA(rk|ψ1 ⊗ φ2), crA(rk|ψ1 ⊗ ψ2)}
is equal to zero. That is, Alice regards these preparation-acts as an-
tidistinguishable.
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2. Alice’s credences about the states of the systems S1 and S2, conditional
on the supposition of theory T and each of the preparations mentioned,
satisfy the NCA.
It then follows, by the argument of Pusey et al. (2012), that Alice should
regard the effects of these preparations to be ontically distinct, conditional
on the supposition of theory T .
Now, of course, Alice might entertain theories for which the CPA does not
hold, and, among those for which it does, her conditional credences might
satisfy the NCA for some but not for others. In this case, she should not be
certain that the effects of these preparations are ontically distinct. However,
her credence that they are must be at least as high as her total credence in
the class of theories for which the above-listed conditions are true. Another
way to put this is: in order to be certain that the effects of these preparations
are not ontically distinct—that is, in order to categorically deny onticity of
quantum states—Alice’s credences in all such theories must be strictly zero.
Though it seems natural from a classical standpoint, quantum mechanics
gives us incentive to question the Cartesian Product Assumption. In the set
of pure states of a bipartite system, product states are rather special, and
every neighbourhood of any product state contains infinitely many entangled
states. If both systems have Hilbert spaces of infinite dimension, then the
entangled states are dense in the set of all states, pure or mixed (see Clifton
and Halvorson 2000, 2001). We should, therefore, take seriously the cases of
theories whose state spaces either lack a Cartesian product component, or
are such that product states cannot reliably be prepared exactly, although
we may be able to approximate them arbitrarily closely. A modification of
the PBR argument that does not employ the Cartesian Product Assumption
is therefore desirable.
In Myrvold (2018, 2020), a substitute for the PIP is proposed, which is
strictly weaker than it and dispenses with the Cartesian Product Assump-
tion. This substitute is called the Preparation Uninformativeness Condition
(PUC).
To state the assumption, we consider the following set-up. Suppose that,
for systems S1, S2, we have some set of possible preparation-acts that can be
performed on the individual systems. Suppose that the choice of preparation
for each of the subsystems is made independently, say, by rolling two separate
dice. Following the preparation of the joint system, which consists of indi-
vidual preparations on the subsystems, you are not told which preparations
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have been performed, but you are given a specification of the ontic state of
the joint system. On the basis of this information, you form credences about
which preparations were performed. In the case of preparations whose effects
you take to be ontically distinct, you will be certain about what preparation
has been performed; otherwise, you may have less than total information
about which preparations were performed.
We ask: under these conditions, if you are now given information about
which preparation was performed on one system, is this informative about
which preparation was performed on the other? The Preparation Uninforma-
tiveness Condition is the condition that it is not. This condition is satisfied
whenever the PIP is. It is also satisfied if you regard the effects of the prepa-
rations to be ontically distinct: in such a case, given the ontic state of the
joint system, you are already certain about which preparations have been
performed, and being told about the preparation on one system will not
shift your credences.
The PUC is implied by the PIP, but it is strictly weaker. Even if the CPA
is assumed, it is possible to construct models for the PBR setup, outlined in
the previous section, in which the PUC is satisfied but the PIP is not. See
Myrvold (2018) for one such construction.
On the assumption of the Preparation Uninformativeness Condition—
which, in the current context, is a condition on the agent’s credences, in-
dependent of the structure of the state space of the theory considered—
one can get a ψ-ontology proof for a class of nonorthogonal states. Let
{φi, ψi} (i = 1, 2) be preparation-acts such that Alice’s credences about
the results of future experiments can be represented by quantum states
{|φi〉, |ψi〉}. If |〈φi|ψi〉| ≤ 1/
√
2, then {|φ1〉|φ2〉, |φ1〉|ψ2〉, |ψ1〉|φ2〉, |ψ1〉|ψ2〉}
is an antidistinguishable set. From these assumptions, together with a mild
side-assumption called the principle of extendibility3, it follows that, for
any theory T such that Alice’s credences satisfy the PUC for each of the
preparation-acts {φ1 ⊗ φ2, φ1 ⊗ ψ2, ψ1 ⊗ φ2, ψ1 ⊗ ψ2}, Alice takes the effects
of the preparation acts {φi, ψi} to be ontically distinct.
A key feature of quantum mechanics used in these proofs is the fact that,
if {|φi〉, |ψi〉} are any state vectors with |〈φi|ψi〉| ≤ 1/
√
2, then
{|φ1〉|φ2〉,|φ1〉|ψ2〉,|ψ1〉|φ2〉,|ψ1〉|ψ2〉}
3This says that any system composed of N subsystems of the same type can be regarded
as a part of a larger system consisting of a greater number of systems of the same type.
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is an antidistinguishable set. What is needed for the argument is that there
exist some preparations and an operation such that Alice’s preparation-
response conditional credences match the Born-rule probabilities yielded by
these states for the outcomes of the experiment envisaged. This is not a
matter of either logical necessity or probabilistic coherence. What we will
assume is that Alice accepts quantum mechanics, in the following sense: for
any quantum state ρ of a system, and any complete set of mutually orthog-
onal projections {P1, . . . , Pn} on the Hilbert space of the system, there is
some combination of preparation-act and readout-operation such that Al-
ice’s credences in the possible results {r1, . . . , rn} match (or at least closely
approximate) the Born-rule probabilities Tr(ρPk).
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The upshot of these theorems is that, for any theory T for which the
assumptions (which may include both assumptions about the theory and
about Alice’s credences conditional on the supposition of the theory), Alice’s
credences, conditional on T , should take the effects of the preparation-acts
considered to be ontically distinct. Thus, her credence in the ontic view
of quantum states should be at least as high as her total credence in the
class of all such theories. The only way that she can categorically deny
that preparation-acts corresponding to distinct quantum states yield onti-
cally distinct states of reality is to attach credence zero to the class of all
such theories.
5 The QBist response
Advocates of QBism will not accept the conclusion that a subjectivist about
quantum probabilities should be a realist about quantum states. Yet the
argument so far has not violated any of the core tenets of QBism. To avoid
the conclusion, QBists must add to its main tenets a further prohibition,
logically independent of the explicitly stated core tenets.
In section 2, we first argued for what, in my opinion, ought to be an
uncontentious claim: that an agent who regards a pair of preparation-acts
to be distinguishable ought to regard the effects of these acts to be ontically
distinct. This has the consequence that, if an agent associates orthogonal
quantum states with a pair of preparation-acts, she ought to take their effects
4Of course, we could reasonably expect something stronger, that this holds, not just for
projections, but also for any positive-operator valued measure (POVM). But the weaker
condition is all that we need.
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to be ontically distinct. The extension of this conclusion to nonorthogonal
quantum states requires additional assumptions, which might be questioned.
But the QBist will want to resist the very first step, having to do with
orthogonal quantum states.
Nonetheless, the reasoning involved does not violate what proponents of
QBism have identified as its fundamental tenets. These are given in different
versions in different venues, but this is true for any of these versions.
Fuchs, Schack, and Mermin (2014) present the following as the “three
fundamental precepts” of QBism.
1. A measurement outcome does not preexist the measurement. An out-
come is created for the agent who takes the measurement action only
when it enters the experience of that agent. The outcome of the mea-
surement is that experience. Experiences do not exist prior to being
experienced.
2. An agent’s assignment of probability 1 to an event expresses that
agent’s personal belief that the event is certain to happen. It does
not imply the existence of an objective mechanism that brings about
the event. Even probability-1 judgments are judgments. They are
judgments in which the judging agent is supremely confident.
3. Parameters that do not appear in the quantum theory and correspond
to nothing in the experience of any potential agent can play no role in
the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Regarding Precept 1: We have not assumed that the result of a readout-
operation (we have refrained from using the misleading term “measurement”)
preexists the operation, or that experiences exist prior to being experienced.
Nor have we presupposed that the result of such an operation merely indicates
a preexisting element of reality.
Regarding Precept 2: What we have concluded is that, if an agent takes
two preparation-acts to be distinguishable with certainty, the agent should
take the effects of those acts to be ontically distinct. The agent may be
mistaken about this, of course. For example: I may be convinced that I will
be able to learn tomorrow about my choices of key-strokes today, because I
regard different choices of what to write today as readout-distinguishable
tomorrow. Accompanying this belief is a belief that distinct choices of
keystrokes today, if I save the file and don’t erase it, have the effect of
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putting my laptop’s internal mechanism into physically distinct states, which
will have observationally distinguishable effects tomorrow. I could be wrong
about this, of course. It might be that my laptop is malfunctioning and
that there are, in fact, no lasting effects of my choices of keystrokes today.
But—and this is the crucial point—if I were to revise my judgment about
the ontic effects of my keystrokes, I would also revise my assessment of the
readout-distinguishability of my choices tomorrow. What I would not do is
simultaneously maintain that my choices today have no effect on the internal
state of the laptop and that the result of the readout operation tomorrow
will be informative about those choices.
Regarding Precept 3: The conclusion that an agent who takes two prepa-
ration acts to be distinguishable should regard the effects of these acts to be
ontically distinct is quite general, and is not specific to quantum mechanics.
It invokes the sort of considerations that can be brought to bear on any sort
of theorizing about the world. It should also be emphasized that the mere
introduction of some sort of physical state-space Ω does not automatically
consign us to the realm of hidden-variables interpretations of quantum me-
chanics. The structure of the physical state-space is left completely open, and
our conclusion that one should take there to be distinctions in physical real-
ity corresponding to distinctions between pure quantum state-preparations
does not, by itself, commit us to anything else.
Fuchs (2017) presents the “three tenets” of QBism as
1. The Born rule is a normative statement.
2. All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective
they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assign-
ments. Quantum states thus have no “ontic hold” on the world.
3. Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the
agent gambling on them.
Regarding Tenet 1: Neither the Born rule, nor anything at all quantum-
mechanical, was invoked in the argument for the conclusion that an agent
should take the effects of preparation-acts that she regards as readout dis-
tinguishable to be ontically distinct. A special case of this is a pair of prepa-
rations that are such that her credences can be represented by a orthog-
onal quantum states. In the extension to non-orthogonal quantum states,
Born-rule probabilities were invoked only in consideration of what sorts of
credences an agent who accepts quantum mechanics should have.
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Regarding Tenet 2: Again, we have not assumed anything at all about
what nature does. Our conclusion has only to do with the meshing of
an agent’s act-outcome conditional credences with her credences about the
states of the physical system that mediates between the acts and the out-
comes. As we have already mentioned in connection with the malfunctioning
laptop, that system is under no obligation to conform to her credences, and,
she may, indeed, find her expectations disappointed. If the last sentence in
the statement of Precept 2 is supposed to indicate a denial of an ontic con-
strual of quantum states, then, despite the “thus,” it does not follow from
the first. As we have seen, one can begin with the assumption that quantum
probabilities are subjective and end with a conclusion that an agent whose
credences conform to quantum mechanics ought to take quantum states to
be ontic.
Regarding Tenet 3: Nothing in the argument depends on whether the
results {rk} of the operation are taken to be things like states of the laptop
screen, or states of the agent’s nervous system, or her conscious experience
upon looking at the screen.
Given that we have not, in our arguments, violated the fundamental
precepts or tenets of QBism, why would, and how could, a QBist resist the
conclusion? The only option open is to reject the claim that there is a causal
relation between my choices of preparation-acts today and my experiences of
the results of readout operations tomorrow that is mediated by the effects of
my actions on the state of the physical system on which I act. There are two
ways to do this. One is to maintain that there is a direct causal link between
my present actions and future experiences, unmediated by any effect of my
actions on the physical system on which I act. The other is to reject all talk
of causal links between my present actions and future experiences.
There are passages in some writings by QBists that suggest the latter.
There is a sense in which this unhinging of the Born Rule from
being a “law of nature” in the usual conception . . . i.e., treating it
as a normative statement, rather than a descriptive one — makes
the QBist notion of quantum indeterminism a far more radical
variety than anything proposed in the quantum debate before. It
says in the end that nature does what it wants, without a mech-
anism underneath, and without any “hidden hand” (Fine 1989)
of the likes of Richard von Mises’s Kollektiv or Karl Popper’s
propensities or David Lewis’s objective chances, or indeed any
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conception that would diminish the autonomy of nature’s events.
Nature and its parts do what they want, and we as free-willed
agents do what we can get away with. Quantum theory, on this
account, is our best means yet for hitching a ride with the uni-
verse’s pervasive creativity and doing what we can to contribute
to it (Fuchs, 2017, 272).
The suggestion is that the physical world obeys neither deterministic nor
stochastic laws.
What sort of physical laws, if any, nature conforms to is not something
that can be known a priori. If someone proposes a physical theory according
to which one should expect to observe certain statistical regularities, that
theory can be subjected to empirical test according to the usual Bayesian
methods. This will never produce certainty that the theory is correct, but
can result in high credence that the theory, or something like it, is at least
approximately correct within a certain domain of application. In particu-
lar, if someone were to propose a theory according to which a given sort of
preparation-act (say, passing a particle of a certain type through a Stern-
Gerlach apparatus oriented vertically, and selecting the + beam) bestowed
determinate chances on certain sorts of subsequent experiments, we could
test that assertion by repeating the preparation-experiment sequence, and
looking to see whether the relative frequencies converged to a stable value,
in accordance with the weak law of large numbers. If we routinely find the
theoretical expectation fulfilled, this should boost credence in the theory; if
the outcomes of the experiment are not at all like what the theory leads us
to expect, this counts as evidence against the theory. One could imagine
that persistent failure to find any sort of regularity at all might boost cre-
dence in the proposition that there are no regularities to be found—if the
agent the agent could survive that long! (It may be a requirement for the
existence of agents that could have credences that there be some modicum
of predictability in the world.)
Despite passages like the one quoted above, I am skeptical that any QBist
actually rejects the claim that there is a causal link between their present
actions and their future experiences, mediated by an effect of their actions on
the physical systems with which they interact. I find it difficult to imagine
how someone whose beliefs were like that would act. I am certain, however,
that someone with beliefs like that would not judge a laptop that was adver-
tised as having more memory—that is, more readout-distinguishable internal
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states that the user could choose between via choice of actions performed on
the machine—to be worth more money than one with less memory. Indeed,
it is hard to see why an agent like that could prefer any laptop at all to a
kumquat as an implement for taking notes.5
Fuchs does not explain what, if anything, he takes to be evidence for the
radical indeterminism of which he speaks. Such evidence cannot have come
from the results of quantum experiments, which, on the contrary, seem to
indicate law-like connections, best expressed in terms of probabilistic laws,
between preparation-acts and experimental outcomes. At any rate, the ev-
idence against the claim that the world is so completely devoid of law-like
regularities that theorizing about it is pointless seems to be overwhelming.
There is, it seems, one possible response for the QBist. This would be to
say that he accepts the thesis of radical indeterminism, of a world subject
neither to deterministic nor stochastic laws, not on the basis of evidence,
but as a leap of faith, or an expression of temperament (see Fuchs 2017,
251-253). Though he believes in no causal connection between his actions on
the world and future experiences, as a psychological weakness he is unable to
set his credences about the future at will, and can only affect his credences
about the future by undergoing a ritual manipulation of the physical objects
around him. He finds himself in the position of someone who does not believe
that a horseshoe hung on the door will bring good luck, but hangs it anyway
because he finds that doing so makes him more optimistic about the future.
If that is the view—namely, that a QBist can offer no reason whatsoever to
accept the radical renunciation of physical theorizing about the world that
acceptance of the view entails—then we are in full agreement on that point.
6 An argument from locality?
In addition to the tenets and precepts listed above, QBism also involves a
severe restriction on the application of quantum mechanics. An agent is
required to only apply quantum probabilities to her own future experiences,
5It is worth re-emphasizing: I am not claiming that anything about the laptop or the
kumquat follows from assertions about the agent’s credences about these systems. The
agent may prefer the laptop to the kumquat as a note-taking device because of a false
belief that the laptop is more suitable to play that role in a causal chain between the
agent’s actions and future experiences. The point is merely that the agent’s belief, true
or false, is a belief about the physical workings of the laptop.
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and not to events (including the experiences of other agents) that she herself
will not experience.
The severity of this restriction of scope is not always sufficiently empha-
sized. Though some of the ideas adopted by QBists are inspired by quantum
information theory, the restriction of credences to one’s own experiences elim-
inates vast swaths of quantum information theory, including everything to
do with communication and cryptography. The point of a communication is
to influence the credences of another agent, and, in designing a communica-
tion protocol, one must consider probabilities of changes to the recipient’s
belief-state.6
There may seem to be an advantage to this restriction: one thereby avoids
quantum nonlocality. If an agent uses quantum mechanics to assign proba-
bilities to events along her own worldline, and never to events at a distance
from herself, all the events to which she assigns probabilities are timelike-
related. There can be no question of action-at-a-distance because there are
no distances between the events she assigns credences to.
This advantage obtains only if one refrains from doing any theorizing,
quantum or otherwise, about events at a distance. Any theory, quantum or
otherwise, that attempts to account for outcomes of tests of Bell inequalities—
if we mean by ‘outcomes’ what is usually meant, namely, detector-registrations
that occur at spacelike separation from each other—will have to violate at
least one of any set of conditions sufficient to yield Bell inequalities.
The seeming advantage is illusory. If one refrains from giving an account
of goings-on in the world that occur at a distance from each other in order
to avoid giving an account of nonlocal goings-on, and if it is held that such
a renunciation is necessary to avoid some sort of nonlocality that is thought
to be objectionable, this is tantamount to saying that if one were to give an
account of goings-on in the world that occur at a distance from each other,
such an account would involve the objectionable sort of nonlocality. If this
6It might be claimed, in response, that Alice, in sending a signal to Bob, is concerned
about the impact on Bob only insofar as it will later impinge on her. This, as everyone
knows, is false. Some of the intended results of a communication are ones that the sender
will never be aware of. As a particularly vivid example, consider a spy whose cover has
been blown, who sends out one last encrypted message before taking a cyanide pill to avoid
capture. A QBist must regard this as a misuse of quantum mechanics if the encryption
scheme is a quantum scheme. It is not! Nor is it a misuse of quantum mechanics for an
engineer designing a nuclear waste storage facility to use quantum mechanics to compute
half-lives with the aim of constructing a facility that will be safe for generations to come.
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differs from acknowledging that the supposedly objectionable nonlocality is
a feature of the world, I don’t know how. It is as if one declined a request to
evaluate a co-worker by saying that one is declining the request in order to
avoid saying that the co-worker is incompetent. In giving such a response,
one has not refrained from conveying one’s judgment of the co-worker’s com-
petence.
7 Conclusion
Subjectivism about probabilities is not, by itself, an escape from ψ-ontology
theorems. The theorems go through with all probabilities interpreted subjec-
tively, with a conclusion that an agent whose credences satisfy the conditions
of the proof should believe that preparation procedures that she associates
with distinct pure quantum states leave the systems on which those pro-
cedures are performed in distinct ontic states. If this conclusion is to be
avoided, some other stricture must be placed on the agent’s credences.
The chief condition that underlies the proof is the assumption of the
possibility of performing a preparation procedure that effectively screens off
correlations between the system on which it is performed and the rest of the
world, rendering a further specification of its physical state uninformative
about the states of other systems. This sort of assumption lies deep at the
heart of virtually all experimental science. None of the empirical evidence
that motivates a shift from classical to quantum theory provides grounds for
rejecting assumptions of this sort. If we ever come to a point at which we
have reasons to doubt this sort of assumption, this will not come about as
a result of experiments that presuppose it. And if we were presented with
a reason to doubt this sort of assumption, it is hard to see how this doubt
could be sufficiently contained so as not to undermine all of experimental
science. Fortunately, we are not in such a position.
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